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It is hard to mistake the air of satisfaction that looms over the concluding 
passages of Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Kant 1998): after the system of 
philosophy has been established, and reason put in its proper place, cleaning up 
and sorting out the history of the preceding millennia of philosophy will be an 
enjoyable and leisurely activity – an activity, however, that constitutes an 
addendum to philosophy, placed outside the margins of it, because history, as 
Kant remarks, is “unphilosophical”. Since it is not concerned with the 
knowledge of principles but rather of the empirically given, history can be 
accorded no place in the system of pure reason. How could Kant have known 
that for the subsequent generation of philosophers – the Idealists, who were all 
raised on the critical philosophy of Kant himself – the question of history would 
take center stage? Indeed, that philosophy would not only concern itself with 
history, interpreted as the procession of events leading up to the present, but 
would even historize the absolute itself by positing that it must subject itself to a 
historical process in order to become manifest. For Kant, history was an 
afterthought to the system; for the Idealists, the system was an afterthought to 
history. Accordingly, new questions gained prominence: not only “what is truly 
historic(al)?” but also, to put it plainly, “what is it to be historical?” Quite 
intriguingly, historical philosophy took over when the philosophy of systems 
no longer seemed viable. 
Following the decline of German Idealism, these questions did not lose 
momentum nor remain a leisurely “aber dabei” to philosophy, in fact, they only 
seemed to multiply and disseminate into all sorts of academic disciplines. 
History developed into an explicit object of study with the consolidation of 
fields like empirical history, evolutionary biology etc. as scientific disciplines. 
With this followed another tendency to interpret the world, society and 
humankind by way of history, i.e. through explicitly scientific methods of 
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historizing. For some philosophers, being historical even came to constitute the 
essence of being a human. This development, however, did not occur linearly 
but culminated in certain peaks, one being the “rise and fall” of 
phenomenology, another being hermeneutics, a third being deconstruction. 
Perhaps, with the erosion of the centuries-old distinction between natural and 
human history due to our entering into a new epoch, the so-called Anthropocene, 
we are just now entering a new peak? What does it reveal about us that we, quite 
extraordinarily, have named and defined our own epoch – one, that we are by 
all means still in the thick of?1 
The seminar, which gave rise to the present volume, was born out of a 
frustration. The question “what is historical?” has been at the tip of 
philosophers’ tongues for several centuries, yet seldom has the question “what 
does it even mean to be historical?” been subjected to exhaustive analysis. 
Instead, philosophers have in great detail examined the historicity of 
understanding, of the philosophical tradition, of Dasein etc. and let the explicit 
question of historicity fall by the wayside. 
The present collection of papers each in their own way take up this 
question of historicity for renewed engagement. Peter Wolsing’s articles 
explicate the roots of the concept of historicity by examining Hegel and 
Gadamer’s understandings of key aspects of the notion and their limitations. 
Jesper Lundsfryd Rasmussen’s paper shines a spotlight on a neglected aspect of 
Schelling’s thought, and the research on historicity, namely the concept of 
transcendental historicity. Søren Harnow Klausen and Thor Hennelund Nielsen 
seek to tread new paths – the former by cementing a much-needed distinction 
between so-called “historical thinking” and “thinking of historicity” and 
drawing out the implications of historicity of understanding; the latter by 
attempting to unfold a theory of so-called “ontological” or “objective” 
historicity, i.e. a theory of historicity not founded in the human subject. In his 
contribution, Thomas Schwarz Wentzer reflects on the foreboding, epoch-
constituting dictum “We are living in the Anthropocene”, posited by Paul 
Crutzen, and what it entails for us humans living in an unusual historic time. 
Lastly, Rasmus Vangshardt contributes the only paper from literary studies in 
 
1 A fact which Jørgen Hass made the editor aware of in conversation. 
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this volume; in it, Vangshardt delineates the difference between “history” and 
“historicism”, including how we engage with and understand ourselves through 
history, through the example of the (non-)difference between Medieval and 
(more) Modern times. The papers are unified in their effort to rethink or draw 
out aspects of the notion of historicity that hitherto have been wanting. 
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